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DISABILITY INSURANCE: 
Preliminary Observations on Overpayments and 
Beneficiary Work Reporting 
Why GAO Did This Study 
SSA’s DI program is one of the 
nation’s largest cash assistance 
programs. To ensure that beneficiaries 
remain eligible, SSA regulations 
require that beneficiaries promptly 
report their work activity—including 
starting a job or a change in wages—to 
the agency in a timely manner. If the 
beneficiary does not report changes or 
if SSA does not properly process 
reported work information, SSA may 
pay out benefits in excess of what is 
due, resulting in an overpayment. In 
fiscal year 2014, SSA identified $1.3 
billion in DI benefit overpayments. 
Avoiding overpayments is imperative 
as they pose a burden for beneficiaries 
who must repay excess benefits and 
result in the loss of taxpayer dollars 
when they cannot be repaid.  
In this statement based on ongoing 
work, GAO discusses preliminary 
observations regarding: 1) what is 
known about the extent of work-related 
DI overpayments; and 2) factors 
affecting SSA’s handling of work 
activity reported by beneficiaries. GAO 
reviewed relevant federal laws, 
policies, and procedures, and prior 
GAO, OIG and SSA reports; analyzed 
10 years of SSA data on 
overpayments; interviewed staff at 
SSA headquarters and at field offices 
and teleservice centers for three 
regions, selected to represent a range 
of relevant DI workloads. 
What GAO Recommends 
As GAO finalizes its work for issuance 
later this year, it will consider making 
recommendations, as appropriate. 
GAO sought SSA’s views on 
information included in this statement, 
but SSA was unable to provide its 
views in time to be incorporated. 
What GAO Found 
Over the last decade, preliminary data provided by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) indicate that more than half of the $20 billion overpaid in 
the Disability Insurance (DI) program was associated with beneficiary work 
activity. Specifically, SSA’s data indicate that between fiscal years 2005 and 
2014, a total of $11 billion in DI overpayments were paid to beneficiaries with 
work earnings that exceeded program limits, with an annual average of 96,000 DI 
beneficiaries incurring an average work-related overpayment of $12,000. In its 
last 6 annual stewardship reports, SSA attributed some improper payments to its 
not taking appropriate action when notified of beneficiaries’ work activity. 
GAO identified a number of factors that affect handling of work activity reports by 
beneficiaries—factors that stem from weaknesses in SSA’s policies and 
procedures that are inconsistent with federal internal control standards. Such 
weaknesses increase the risk that overpayments may occur even when DI 
beneficiaries diligently try to follow program rules and report work and earnings. 
These weaknesses include: 
• Vulnerabilities in processing work reports. Based on interviews with SSA 
staff, GAO identified process vulnerabilities that could result in staff not: (1) 
issuing a receipt that proves the beneficiary’s work was reported—one of two 
criteria a beneficiary must meet for SSA to waive an overpayment; and (2) 
initiating tracking of work activity, which would help prevent overpayments. 
Data are not available to determine the extent to which this might occur. 
• Limited guidance for processing and monitoring work reports. While 
SSA has metrics to ensure that staff take action on work reports in a timely 
manner, it lacks procedures detailing steps staff must take in screening these 
reports and for ensuring that pending work reports are systematically 
reviewed and closed with appropriate action, consistent with federal internal 
control standards. 
• Not leveraging technology. In contrast to SSA’s Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) program—a means-tested disability benefits program—the DI 
program lacks automated tools for beneficiaries to report work. SSI recipients 
can report wages through an automated telephone reporting system and a 
smartphone app. SSA cited complex DI program rules and an unclear return 
on investment for not pursuing these options. However, this conclusion was 
based on a limited evaluation of costs. Meanwhile, SSA’s current manual 
approach is vulnerable to error and may discourage reporting by 
beneficiaries who experience long wait times when they try to report work in 
person at offices or by telephone. 
• Confusing work incentive rules. The DI program has complex work 
incentive rules, such that SSA staff interviewed by GAO had varying 
interpretations of program rules and gave beneficiaries differing instructions 
on how often to report their work and earnings. In 2012, SSA developed a 
proposal to simplify program rules, but stated that it does not currently have 
the authority to test or implement such changes.  SSA requested authority 
that would allow it to conduct such tests in its 2016 budget proposal. 
View GAO-15-673T. For more information, 
contact Daniel Bertoni at (202) 512-7215 or 
bertonid@gao.gov. 
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Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Becerra and Members of the 
Subcommittee: 
I’m pleased to discuss the Social Security Administration’s (SSA) efforts 
to address overpayments and reported work activity for the Disability 
Insurance (DI) program. The DI program is one of the nation’s largest 
cash assistance programs. In fiscal year 2014, about 11 million 
individuals with disabilities and their dependents received approximately 
$143 billion in DI benefits. During the same year, SSA reported detecting 
$1.3 billion in new DI benefit overpayments,1 which occur when SSA pays 
benefits in excess of what is due, or continues to pay those who are no 
longer eligible. Overpayments often result when beneficiary work and 
earnings activity—which can affect program eligibility—is not properly 
reported to or processed by SSA. Overpayments can pose a financial 
hardship for beneficiaries responsible for repaying the debt, or result in 
the loss of taxpayer dollars when beneficiaries are unable to repay. 
Unrecovered overpayments may also have implications for the long-term 
solvency of the DI trust fund, which DI Trustees project will be exhausted 
in 2016. In addition, researchers and others have noted that 
overpayments may also create a disincentive to beneficiaries who might 
otherwise wish to work.2 
My statement today provides preliminary observations from our ongoing 
review for this subcommittee and discusses (1) what is known about the 
extent of work-related DI overpayments; and (2) factors affecting the 
handling of work activity reported by beneficiaries. To examine these 
issues, we reviewed 10 years of SSA data on overpayment debt 
identified, collected, or written off, which includes waivers and 
overpayments for which collection activities have been terminated. We 
                                                                                                                    
1 SSA provided GAO summary data on new debt detected each fiscal year for fiscal years 
2005 through 2014. SSA cites the source of this data as the fourth quarter report of the 
Treasury Report on Receivables for each fiscal year. 
2 For example, The Social Security Administration’s Employment Support Programs for 
Disability Beneficiaries, 111th Cong. 24-25 (2009)(statement of Cheryl Bates-Harris, 
Senior Disability Advocacy Specialist, National Disability Rights Network, on behalf of the 
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities Employment and Training Task Force and Social 
Security Task Force) and Gina A. Livermore, Cornell Center for Policy Research, Wage 
Reporting and Earnings-Related Overpayments in the Social Security Disability Programs: 
Status, Implications, and Suggestions for Improvement, a report prepared at the request 
of Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Advisory Panel, Social Security Administration, 
May 5, 2003. 
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reviewed relevant federal laws and regulations. In addition, we identified 
agency policies and procedures for processing work reports and 
assessed these against federal internal control standards.3 We also 
identified management strategies and tools used to oversee these 
processes, and assessed them against federal internal control standards. 
We examined prior relevant reviews by SSA, GAO and SSA’s Office of 
Inspector General, interviewed managers and staff in headquarters and at 
several offices in three regions, selected to reflect a range of workloads, 
and spoke with a national disability rights network representing groups 
that assist disability beneficiaries. Findings presented here are 
preliminary, and we will issue a final report later this year. GAO sought 
SSA’s views on information included in this statement, but SSA was 
unable to provide its views in time to be incorporated. 
We are conducting our work in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 
and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained will provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. 
 
The DI program was established in 1956 to provide monthly cash benefits 
to individuals unable to work because of severe long-term disability. To 
meet the definition of disability under the DI program, an individual must 
have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that (1) has 
lasted or is expected to last at least one year or to result in death and (2) 
prevents the individual from engaging in substantial gainful activity 
(SGA).4 In addition, to be eligible for benefits, workers with disabilities 
must have a specified number of recent work credits under Social 
Security when they acquired a disability. Spouses and children of workers 
may also receive benefits. Benefits are financed by payroll taxes paid into 
the DI Trust Fund by covered workers and their employers, and the 
benefit amount is based on a worker’s earnings history. In November 
                                                                                                                    
3 Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 
4 The SGA monthly earnings limit in 2015 is $1,090 ($1,820 for blind beneficiaries). 
Background 
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2014, the program’s average monthly benefit for disabled workers was 
about $1,146. 
Historically, very few DI beneficiaries have left the program to return to 
work. To encourage work, the DI program offers various work incentives 
to reduce the risk a beneficiary faces in trading guaranteed monthly 
income and subsidized health coverage for the uncertainties of 
employment—including a trial work period, and an extended period of 
eligibility for DI benefits. These incentives safeguard cash and health 
benefits while a beneficiary tries to return to work. For example, the trial 
work period allows DI beneficiaries to work for a limited time without their 
earnings affecting their disability benefits. Each month in which earnings 
are more than $780 is counted as a month of the trial work period. When 
the beneficiary has accumulated 9 such months (not necessarily 
consecutive) within a period of 60 consecutive months, the trial work 
period is completed. The extended period of eligibility begins the month 
after the trial work period ends, during which a beneficiary is entitled to 
benefits so long as he or she continues to meet the definition of disability 
and his or her earnings fall below the SGA monthly earnings limit. 
SSA regulations require all DI beneficiaries to promptly notify SSA when: 
their condition improves, they return to work, or they increase the amount 
they work or their earnings.5 Program guidance directs DI beneficiaries to 
report to SSA right away if work starts or stops; if duties, hours or pay 
change; or they stop paying for items or services needed for work due to 
a disability. Beneficiaries may report work by fax, mail, phone, or in 
person at an SSA field office. SSA staff are required by law and 
regulation to issue a receipt acknowledging that the beneficiary (or 
representative) has given SSA information about a change in work or 
earnings, and documenting the date that SSA received the work report. 
After receiving information about work activity or a pay stub from a 
beneficiary, SSA staff have five days to input the information into the 
system—which creates a pending work report or pay stub report—and 
hand or mail a receipt to the beneficiary.6 Staff then have an additional 30 
days to review the pending work report to determine if an additional 
                                                                                                                    
5 20 C.F.R. § 404.1588(a). 
6 SSA guidance directs staff to give or mail the receipt immediately if beneficiary work 
reports are made in person or by phone; for mailed or faxed reports, or reports dropped off 
in the field office, staff are directed to input the information into the system and mail the 
receipt within 5 days of receipt of the information. 
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action, such as a work continuing disability review (CDR),7 is needed to 
assess the beneficiary’s continued eligibility for DI benefits. See figure 1. 
SSA processes over 100,000 work reports or pay stubs annually. 
Figure 1: SSA’s Procedures for Processing DI Beneficiary Work Reports 
 
                                                                                                                    
7 Work CDRs are reviews of beneficiary earnings to determine continued eligibility for 
benefits. These reviews typically involve SSA staff querying centralized agency data 
systems to identify earnings, sending forms to a beneficiary requesting information about 
work activity and earnings that may affect eligibility for DI benefits, contacting employers 
to verify earnings amounts, and assessing other factors such as employer subsidies and 
impairment-related work expenses. 
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a SSA staff also input pay stub information into eWork within 5 days, but the resulting pay stub reports 
are not subject to the 30-day time frame that applies to work reports. 
 
Benefit overpayments can occur when beneficiaries do not report work or 
SSA does not take action on work reports in an appropriate or timely 
manner. When a DI work-related overpayment is identified, the 
beneficiary is notified of the overpayment and may request 
reconsideration or waiver of that overpayment.8 SSA may grant a waiver 
request if the agency finds the beneficiary was not at fault AND recovery 
or adjustment would either defeat the purpose of the program or be 
against equity and good conscience, as defined by SSA.9 
SSA’s DI cumulative overpayment debt has almost doubled over the last 
decade, growing from $3.2 billion at the end of fiscal year 2004 to $6.3 
billion at the end of fiscal year 2014, according to SSA data.10,11 
Cumulative overpayment debt is comprised of existing debt carried 
forward from prior years, new debt, reestablished debts (debts reactivated 
for collection due to re-entitlement or another event) and adjustments, 
                                                                                                                    
8 A beneficiary requests reconsideration when he or she disputes the occurrence of the 
overpayment itself, 20 C.F.R. § 404.907, and requests a waiver when asserting he or she 
is both not at fault for the overpayment and incapable of repaying the debt, 20 C.F.R. § 
404.506. A waiver permanently terminates collection of a debt and removes the debt from 
SSA’s balance sheet. 
9 20 C.F.R. § 404.509. 
10 GAO previously reported that cumulative DI overpayment debt is understated due to a 
limitation in SSA’s Recovery of Overpayments, Accounting and Reporting (ROAR) 
system. Used to track overpayments and collections, ROAR cannot capture and track 
debt scheduled to be collected beyond the year 2049. As a result, the amount scheduled 
to be collected after that year is not reflected in current totals even as it annually 
increases. GAO recommended that SSA correct the ROAR 2049 system limitation so that 
debt scheduled for collection after 2049 is included in the system and available for SSA 
management, analysis, and reporting. SSA agreed with this recommendation. For more 
information see GAO, Disability Insurance: SSA Can Improve Efforts to Detect, Prevent, 
and Recover Overpayments, GAO-11-724 (Washington, DC: July 27, 2011). 
11 SSA provided summary data on cumulative debt, new debt detected, adjustments, 
collections, and write-offs for each fiscal year for fiscal years 2005 through 2014. SSA 
cites the source of this data as the fourth quarter report of the Treasury Report on 
Receivables for each fiscal year. 
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minus debts that are collected or written off by SSA.12 Cumulative DI 
overpayment debt has continued to grow because in nine of the last ten 
years the debt added exceeded the total debt collected and written off. 
Specifically, over the 10 years reviewed, SSA added about $15.4 billion in 
debt,13 while collecting and writing-off $12.3 billion.14 
 
According to preliminary data provided by SSA, the agency overpaid DI 
beneficiaries a total of about $20 billion during fiscal years 2005 through 
2014, and more than half of this total ($11 billion) was a result of 
beneficiaries’ work-related earnings exceeding program limits.15 
According to these data, each fiscal year an average of about 96,000 DI 
beneficiaries (or 28 percent of all beneficiaries overpaid each year) 
received excess benefits totaling $1.1 billion because their work activity 
exceeded program limits. The average work-related overpayment per 
beneficiary was almost $12,000 during this time period, ranging from 
$10,456 in fiscal year 2014 to $14,208 in fiscal year 2011. We are 
continuing to assess the reliability of these data as part of our ongoing 
work. 
                                                                                                                    
12 Write-offs include waivers and terminated collections. Waivers represent money the 
agency will never recover because they permanently remove overpayments from SSA’s 
accounts receivable balance. Terminated collections conditionally remove debts from 
SSA’s accounts receivable balance, as the agency has ceased active internal collection 
efforts, but they are available for future collection if the debtor becomes re-entitled to 
benefits. SSA will re-establish the debt and resume recovery through benefit withholding. 
SSA will also reestablish the debt if it receives a collection from one of its external 
collection methods such as tax refund offset. 
13 New debt accounted for about $14 billion, or about 91 percent of the total added debt. 
Reestablished debts, which are debts reactivated for collection due to re-entitlement or 
other event, and adjustments accounted for about $686 million and $667 million of the 
total respectively. 
14 During this period, SSA collected $7.8 billion and wrote off $4.5 billion.  
15 These preliminary data on overpayments during fiscal years 2005 through 2014 were 
extracted from SSA’s Recovery of Overpayments, Accounting and Reporting system 
(ROAR) master file on May 11, 2015, and do not match information on new debt found in 
the fourth quarter Treasury Report on Receivables for those years which contain data as 
of the end of each fiscal year. SSA attributes the difference to the fact that the ROAR 
master file is continuously updated, including debt established in prior years. GAO will 
continue to review the reliability of the ROAR data and include the results in our final 
report expected to be issued later this year. 
Most DI Overpayment 
Amounts Are 
Associated with 
Work-Related Activity 
That Exceeds 
Program Limits 
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SSA’s annual stewardship reviews provide limited insight into the causes 
of overpayments. Stewardship reviews are based on a sample of cases, 
and are used by the agency to report on the accuracy of benefit 
payments.16 In its stewardship reports, SSA uses the term deficiency 
dollars to quantify the effect of each individual deficiency in a case which 
could cause an improper payment.17 In its last six stewardship reports, 
SSA reported that deficiency dollars related to beneficiaries’ incomes 
being above DI program limits were consistently a leading cause of 
improper overpayments in the DI program.18 SSA also attributed some of 
these deficiencies to not taking appropriate or timely action to adjust 
payments when it was notified of beneficiaries’ work activity. However, 
GAO has not yet fully evaluated SSA’s methodology for conducting these 
reviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
16 Due to small sample sizes, SSA reports its findings on deficiencies in five year 
increments. Its 2014 report includes results for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 while its 
2013 report includes 2009 through 2013 results.  
17 An improper payment is any payment that should not have been made or that was 
made in an incorrect amount under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other legally 
applicable guidance. According to SSA, certain overpayments are unavoidable and not 
improper if the payment is required by statute, regulations, or court order. SSA refers to 
each error in a case which causes an improper payment as a deficiency.  
18 Deficiency dollars track the individual effect of each separate deficiency. Because SSA 
may identify more than one error causing the same improper payment in some cases it 
reviews, deficiency dollars can be greater than the total overpayment for each case.  
Process 
Vulnerabilities and 
Complex Program 
Rules May Pose 
Challenges to 
Correctly Handling 
Work Reports 
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Based on our discussions with SSA staff in field offices and teleservice 
centers, we identified a number of situations where beneficiaries report 
work or earnings, but staff may not enter information into the system, 
which is inconsistent with federal internal control standards,19 or may not 
provide a receipt, as mandated by law.20 Whether DI beneficiaries report 
work information in person or by fax, mail, or telephone to SSA field 
offices or the agency’s 800 teleservice line, in accordance with 
procedures, staff must manually enter the information into the system to 
initiate tracking and issue a receipt. Specifically, SSA representatives 
have five days to manually enter the information into the eWork21 system, 
which also generates a receipt to be mailed or given to the beneficiary. 
Issuing a receipt is required by law and valuable to the beneficiary for two 
reasons: (1) the beneficiary can review the receipt to ensure that the 
information is correct; and (2) a beneficiary who later receives an 
overpayment can produce work report receipts to prove that he/she 
properly reported work activity.22 This system also tracks pending work 
reports to ensure completion within 30 days. Tracking is critical for 
ensuring SSA promptly processes the work report and takes the actions 
needed to adjust a beneficiary’s benefits and minimize the chance of 
overpayments. 
However, in our work at several locations, SSA staff told us that if the 
eWork system is unavailable, or if the representative is busy, he or she 
may not enter the information and issue a receipt to the beneficiary. In 
addition, at one location, we learned that, until recently, SSA teleservice 
staff were using an alternate approach for sending work reports to the 
                                                                                                                    
19 In accordance with federal internal control standards, agencies should ensure that all 
transactions are recorded promptly and accurately to help management control operations 
and make decisions. Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 
20 As noted earlier, SSA staff are required by law and regulation to issue a receipt 
acknowledging that the beneficiary (or representative) has given SSA information about a 
change in work or earnings, and documenting the date that SSA received the work report. 
21 In 2004, SSA implemented the eWork system, which is the primary system for 
processing work CDR cases in headquarters and field locations. 
22 Being able to demonstrate that a beneficiary is “without fault” for an overpayment is the 
first criterion that must be met when SSA decides whether an overpayment can be waived 
and work report receipts can provide verification that the beneficiary has properly fulfilled 
the obligation to report. 
Vulnerabilities in 
Processing DI Work 
Reports 
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field office for manual entry and processing,23 instead of directly entering 
the information into the eWork system themselves. Work reports handled 
this way lack the controls in eWork; for example, they are not 
automatically tracked against the 30-day goal for work report completion. 
As such, they can be more easily missed or overlooked, and could be 
deleted or marked as completed without action being taken. Finally, 
claims representatives in the field office may also bypass the work report 
process entirely and initiate a work continuing disability review (CDR) 
instead. Some SSA claims representatives we interviewed told us that 
they skip the work report step and do a CDR instead because it is more 
efficient, but this means that the beneficiary does not receive a receipt. 
Stakeholder groups we interviewed have also observed problems with 
receipts, but SSA has limited data to assess this and other vulnerabilities 
in the work reporting process. In particular, stakeholders said that 
beneficiaries they work with do not always receive receipts, especially 
when reporting work by calling the 800 teleservice line. However, SSA’s 
ability to determine the extent of these vulnerabilities is hindered, in part, 
due to data limitations. SSA’s eWork system does not capture data that 
would help the agency determine how many work reports are filed by fax, 
mail, or in person. This system also does not allow SSA to determine how 
often staff go directly to a CDR without first completing a work report and 
issuing a receipt. Moreover, while SSA’s system archives copies of 
printed receipts, it does not provide aggregate data on receipts provided. 
So even though SSA officials noted that local offices have procedures in 
place to ensure the timely processing of information received by mail or 
fax, data limitations prevent SSA from knowing the extent to which 
receipts are provided within five days. Further, according to SSA officials, 
determining the extent to which 800 teleservice staff might be using 
alternative approaches for sending work reports to field offices would 
require a significant effort to match data between two different systems. 
 
Although the agency monitors work reports for timeliness, SSA lacks 
guidance for processing work reports through completion, and monitoring 
them for quality. SSA has set a 30-day time frame for staff to screen 
pending work reports, and decide whether further action is required in 
                                                                                                                    
23 Rather than eWork, teleservice staff may use Modernized Development Worksheets 
(MDW) to transmit beneficiary work information to a field office. MDWs are a type of inter-
office message used to request assistance from another SSA office. 
Limited Guidance for 
Processing and Monitoring 
Work Reports 
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light of the information in the work report, or whether the work report can 
be closed without additional action. Field office managers who oversee 
field office workloads have access to management information showing 
the number and age of pending work reports, and those we interviewed 
indicated that they follow up on pending work reports approaching the 30-
day timeframe to ensure timely processing. However, the agency has not 
established policies or procedures detailing the steps staff must take in 
screening these reports. Federal internal control standards state that 
agencies’ policies and procedures should be clearly documented in 
administrative policies or operating manuals.24 Without explicit policies or 
procedures on how to screen a work report—that is, how to evaluate 
whether it should be closed or referred to a work CDR to determine 
whether the beneficiary’s benefits should be adjusted—there is an 
increased risk that a report could be improperly closed, and result in a 
beneficiary being overpaid. SSA also lacks guidance and processes for 
ensuring the accuracy and quality of its work report decisions. In our work 
at several field locations, we did not identify any processes that would 
have either assessed the accuracy or quality of the screening decision, or 
provide feedback to staff on how to improve their decision making.25 In 
accordance with federal internal control standards, agencies should 
assure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of normal operations, 
and assess the quality of performance over time.26 The absence of 
oversight and feedback increases the risk that the agency may not 
identify errors with work report decisions in a timely manner. 
 
                                                                                                                    
24 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 
25 SSA’s policy manual states that all work activity should be evaluated during the work 
CDR process. This includes reviewing and, if necessary, correcting or updating the work 
report information previously provided by DI beneficiaries. However, this policy does not 
cover work reports that are closed without going through the CDR process, and does not 
establish guidance for how to review and provide feedback on the initial work report 
decision. 
26 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 
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SSA does not offer automated reporting options for DI beneficiaries —
similar to those currently used in SSA’s Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) program27— even though such options could address vulnerabilities 
we identified. According to SSA officials, SSA first piloted a telephone 
wage reporting system for SSI beneficiaries in 2003, and has used it 
nationally since 2008. In 2013, the agency also rolled out a mobile 
smartphone application for reporting work activity for SSI. Unlike the DI 
program’s manual process, both of these SSI reporting options assist with 
agency tracking and issue receipts to the beneficiary without staff 
intervention. SSA has also noted that these automated reporting tools 
make reporting easier and more convenient for beneficiaries, and reduce 
field office workloads. SSA reported that it processed over 44,000 SSI 
telephone wage reports in September 2013, surpassing its fiscal year 
2013 goal of 38,510 reports per month. In September 2013, the agency 
also received over 5,100 wage reports through its smartphone 
application. SSA continues to promote these methods and has stated that 
expanded use of automated reporting should help reduce improper 
payments in the SSI program. 
Despite potential benefits to the DI program, SSA officials told us the 
agency has not used SSI reporting systems for DI beneficiaries. In 
October 2010, SSA created a work group to begin exploring the 
development of a telephone reporting system for the DI program but, 
according to SSA officials, the project was discontinued in February 
2011—after developing cost estimates for one year of development—due 
to lack of resources. They also told us these efforts were not resumed 
because the automated reporting in the DI program would not have the 
same return on investment as in the SSI program, due to the complexity 
of DI program rules. For example, officials stated determinations 
concerning DI work incentives—determinations that are currently a part of 
the work CDR process, not the DI work reporting process—cannot be 
easily automated.28 SSA officials also stated that they currently favor 
                                                                                                                    
27 The Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, which is administered by the Social 
Security Administration (SSA), provides cash assistance to financially needy individuals 
who are aged, blind, or disabled. Although concurrent DI and SSI beneficiaries may report 
their wages using the SSI automated systems, DI-only beneficiaries are excluded. 
28 In processing DI work reports, SSA staff may document various information relevant to 
DI work incentives, such as earnings and employment-related work expenses—but 
determinations concerning how that information impacts benefits are made during the 
work CDR process .  
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using the www.mysocialsecurity.gov portal as the best approach for 
providing automated reporting options to DI beneficiaries. However, they 
did not provide any information on plans, timelines or costs associated 
with implementing such an approach. In the meantime, the current, 
manual DI work activity reporting options leave the process more 
vulnerable to error, provide less proof of beneficiaries’ due diligence, and 
subject beneficiaries to less convenient reporting mechanisms.29 
 
Overpayments may arise because of unclear work reporting requirements 
and staff’s differing interpretations of complex DI program rules. For 
example, SSA’s regulations and its policy manual both state that DI 
beneficiaries should “promptly” report changes to work activity, but SSA 
has not defined this term, leaving this open to interpretation by both 
beneficiaries and SSA staff. Similarly, in its pamphlet “Working While 
Disabled,” beneficiaries are instructed to report changes in their work 
“right away.” However it does not prescribe a time period or frequency of 
reporting. During our site visits, we found variation in how staff instructed 
beneficiaries to report. For example, some staff said they instruct 
beneficiaries to report monthly, regardless of whether there are changes 
in their work, which is similar to the SSI program’s wage-reporting 
requirements. Others told us they tell beneficiaries to report 10 days after 
any change, which is also similar to another SSI reporting requirement. 
One staff person indicated that she instructs beneficiaries not to bother 
reporting earnings under $15,780 per year, even though this earnings 
limit applies to those receiving Social Security retirement benefits, not 
DI.30 Thus a DI beneficiary who relied on such information could incur an 
overpayment. According to federal internal control standards, federal 
agencies should ensure that pertinent information is distributed to the 
right people in sufficient detail and at the appropriate time to enable them 
to carry out their duties and responsibilities efficiently and effectively. 
Further, our preliminary findings suggest that some SSA staff do not fully 
understand DI’s complex work incentive rules. Service representatives 
                                                                                                                    
29 In fiscal year 2014, SSA reported that its average speed of answer on the 800 
teleservice line was about 23 minutes. Similarly, DI beneficiaries may face long wait times 
in local field offices, particularly at the beginning of each month. 
30 For some Social Security retirement beneficiaries, SSA deducts $1 in benefits for each 
$2 in earnings above the 2015 annual earnings limit of $15,720. 
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who take work reports through SSA’s 800 teleservice line or at the 
window in an SSA office are generally less highly trained or specialized in 
their knowledge about work incentives and may not always provide 
accurate information. For example, several staff we spoke with confused 
the trial work period earnings threshold with substantial gainful activity 
(SGA) earnings limits.31 Such a mistake might result in beneficiaries—
who, for example, plan to return to work—being told not to report earnings 
that they should be reporting. Stakeholder groups we spoke with cited 
similar examples of SSA staff providing beneficiaries with incorrect 
information on work incentives. SSA officials told us that in fiscal year 
2013, the agency sampled calls received on its 800 teleservice line for 
quality review purposes, and found that calls regarding disabled work 
activity represented only 1 percent of the total call workload, but 2.3 
percent of all errors identified. Several SSA managers we spoke with said 
that training could be enhanced for those staff answering calls on SSA’s 
800 teleservice line. 
SSA has developed a proposal to reduce complexity in the DI program, 
but has not tested or implemented this proposal to date. In its fiscal year 
2012 budget request, SSA proposed the Work Incentives Simplification 
Pilot (WISP), to test a streamlined approach to evaluating DI Program 
work activity and reduce administrative workloads by making it simpler 
and less time-consuming for staff to verify earnings and validate benefits. 
It was also intended to reduce improper payments and eliminate rules 
that confuse beneficiaries, such as different definitions for income for the 
DI versus SSI program.32 Ultimately the agency hopes such an effort will 
reduce incidences of overpayments that may serve as a disincentive to DI 
beneficiaries who wish to work. SSA convened a Technical Advisory 
Panel to design a demonstration of WISP, which issued a report with 
recommendations in 2012 but also noted that the agency lacks authority 
                                                                                                                    
31 During the trial work period, beneficiaries receive their full Social Security disability 
benefits regardless of how much they earn, as long as they report work activity and 
continue to have a disabling impairment. In 2015, a trial work period month is any month 
in which total earnings are over $780, and the trial work period continues until a 
beneficiary has worked nine months within a 60-month period. In contrast, the SGA 
monthly earnings limit in 2015 is $1,090 ($1,820 for blind beneficiaries) and is applicable 
after the 9-month trial work period is completed. 
32 Under the DI program, earnings are counted when earned, while under the SSI 
program earnings are counted when paid. For beneficiaries who receive benefits from 
both programs, SSA may have to contact beneficiaries, employers, or both to obtain 
additional information in order to correctly calculate earnings both ways. 
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to implement the proposed demonstration.33 However, the report also 
noted that SSA could conduct a pre-test to inform a large demonstration. 
This is an issue we will continue to explore in our ongoing work. 
Despite the importance and challenges associated with work reporting, 
SSA provides beneficiaries with infrequent reminders, and those 
reminders it does provide contain limited information about potential 
liability for overpayments. GAO’s internal control standards state that 
management should ensure there are adequate means of communicating 
with, and obtaining information from, external stakeholders that may have 
a significant impact on the agency achieving its goals.34 SSA currently 
informs beneficiaries of reporting requirements when their benefit claim is 
initially approved; although it could be many years before a beneficiary 
returns to work. Nevertheless, one SSA representative/ manager 
indicated that the page signed by beneficiaries when they are initially 
approved for benefits could specifically include information about work 
reporting requirements, which would make it more difficult for 
beneficiaries who incur an overpayment to claim that they were unaware 
of their reporting responsibilities. SSA also sends an annual letter to 
beneficiaries regarding cost-of-living adjustments to their benefits that 
includes a reminder of their reporting responsibilities; however, several 
staff indicated that additional reminders would prompt more beneficiaries 
to report work. In contrast, in fiscal year 2014, SSA began providing a 
web-based service designed to prompt SSI beneficiaries to report wages, 
using notices, emails and reminders—an option not currently available for 
DI beneficiaries.35 SSA officials stated that the agency does not have 
near-term plans to provide additional notices to DI beneficiaries to 
encourage work reporting. Finally, although the initial application and 
annual letter mention potential liability for overpayments for beneficiaries 
who fail to report work, SSA’s “Working While Disabled” pamphlet—which 
                                                                                                                    
33 Since 1985, SSA’s demonstration authority has been extended five times. The most 
recent of these extensions expired in 2005. In 2008, GAO found that SSA’s demonstration 
projects had little impact on disability policy and the SSDI and SSI programs. (Social 
Security Disability: Management Controls Needed to Strengthen Demonstration Projects. 
GAO-08-1053 (Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2008). SSA’s 2016 budget proposal 
included a request to reauthorize and expand demonstration authority for the DI and SSI 
programs. 
34 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
35 SSA established this web-based system because it deemed unreported and untimely 
reported wages to be a major source of SSI program payment errors. 
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contains details about work incentives and is provided to beneficiaries 
who contact SSA about work—does not explain circumstances under 
which a beneficiary could be found liable for an overpayment. Some SSA 
staff we spoke with said they tell beneficiaries not to spend benefit checks 
or deposits that they believe were sent in error. However one stakeholder 
group we spoke with said that many beneficiaries mistakenly believe that, 
if they diligently report work and still receive benefits, then they must be 
entitled to those benefits. We will continue to assess the issues discussed 
in this statement and will report our final results later this year. 
Chairman Johnson, Ranking Member Becerra, and members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 
pleased to respond to any questions that you may have at this time. 
 
If you or your staff have any questions about this testimony, please 
contact me at (202) 512-7215 or bertonid@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this statement. GAO staff members who made key 
contributions to this testimony are Michele Grgich (Assistant Director), 
James Bennett, Daniel Concepcion, Julie DeVault, Dana Hopings, Arthur 
Merriam, Jean McSween, Ruben Montes de Oca, James Rebbe, Martin 
Scire, Charlie Willson, and Jill Yost. 
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